<Chapter 3> New agendas, old habits in Amazonian forest policies by De Jong, Wil
Title<Chapter 3> New agendas, old habits in Amazonian forestpolicies
Author(s)De Jong, Wil




© Center for Integrated Area Studies (CIAS), Kyoto
University; The opinions expressed in this publication do not
necessary represent the point of view of the Center for
Integrated Area Studies, Kyoto University. The chapters in this
publication present the opinion of the authors and not of the
editor.; The total or partial reproduction of this publication, by
any means is prohibited without the explicit written
authorization of the Center for Integrated Area Studies, Kyoto
University.; This publication can be cited, providing due credit
is given to the authors, editor and publishing organization.
Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere   |   Page 25
1. Introduction
The last two decades have seen important and 
encouraging changes in the forest sector worldwide, 
what Sunderlin et al. (2008) call a forest paradigm 
shift. Since the late 1970s tropical deforestation has 
become an issue of worldwide concern. The issue 
was high on the agenda of the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in 
Rio de Janeiro, and this pivotal meeting has been 
followed by subsequent intergovernmental forums 
and plans of actions, currently known as the United 
Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF 2009). This 
forum and participating UN member countries 
are committed to achieving sustainable forest 
management and enhancing the contributions of 
forest to development goals. Similar changes have 
been taking place at the country level. Since the 
early 1990s many countries have adjusted their 
legislation to reflect the changing views of forest. 
This has included legislation to transfer property 
rights to local forest users, which has encouraged 
granting indigenous and small holder private 
ownership or allocating forest land exclusively for 
local users (Sunderlin et al. 2008). In addition 
to these wider forest governance changes, related 
projects in communal forest management and 
communal forest enterprise development have 
emerged (Sabogal et al. 2008). Community forestry 
has been introduced and promoted throughout 
Latin America (Ibid.) with important successes in 
Central America and Mexico (Bray et al. 2005).
The forest sectors in countries in the Amazon 
basin have experienced equally profound changes 
of the last two decades. Most relevant, perhaps, 
has been the change in formal property rights over 
forest lands, which has advanced more in South 
American countries than anywhere else in the world 
(Sunderlin et al. 2008). Since the mid-1990s forest 
policies have been adjusted to refocus the forest 
sector on rural development and conservation, as 
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opposed to promoting corporate forestry dedicated 
to commercial timber extraction. These recent shifts 
suggest that forest conservation, equitable benefit 
sharing and national development objectives are 
better addressed now than they were several decades 
ago.
In 2008, tropical forestry took a new turn. The 
contribution of forest conversion or degradation 
to global carbon emission is generating many so-
called REDD initiatives (Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation). REDD 
was preceded by payment for environmental 
services (PES), which includes REDD as well as 
other services like downstream water regimes and 
biodiversity conservation. REDD and PES increase 
the market value of intact natural forests. Holding 
ownership over those forests should, in theory, 
create conditions that allow people to benefit from 
the increased value of standing natural forests.
Other factors, however, are having worrisome 
effects on forests and their benefits. Biofuel 
production—carbon dioxide neutral alternatives to 
fossil fuel—is gearing up in major tropical forest 
countries like Indonesia and Brazil. While biofuels 
and REDD initiatives are the most visible and high 
profile trends in tropical forestry these days, other 
trends can also be expected to have impacts: high 
oil prices, as experienced in 2008, and the current 
international financial crisis will arguably continue 
to impact tropical forests. Both trends already have 
seriously impacted rural livelihoods as commodity 
prices have increased, incomes declined, foreign 
remittances reduced and a vast number of people 
returned to the countryside from cities because of 
lost jobs. The latter trends are likely to continue for 
some time, and it can be expected that rural people 
will increasingly turn to forests to make up for the 
economic downturn.
While the sketch of the forest sector above 
might suggest that Amazon countries would be 
well positioned for appropriate policy responses to 
the trends presented, a closer look at the political 
landscape invites a more sobering outlook. A 
deeper examination shows important positive 
developments but also some persistent obstacles 
that have prevented the forest sector from achieving 
rural development and conservation objectives, 
even though these objectives were actively pursued 
in policies and legislation. Furthermore, in several 
of the countries with Amazon territories, the wider 
political landscape is negatively affecting the forest 
sector. 
This paper aims to provide a brief synopsis 
of the forest sector and its recent policies in the 
Amazon basin. The paper also presents some of the 
extra-sectoral factors that are currently influencing 
forestry itself. Based on this overview, the paper 
then speculates on what may lie ahead given the 
contemporary worldwide trends mentioned. The 
focus of this discussion is Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, 
three countries that hold within their territories 
7%, 60% and 13% respectively of the 5.5 million 
km2 total Amazon tropical forest. These countries 
are growing increasingly connected by an ever-
expanding road network, a fact that will greatly 
influence the future of the Amazon forest landscape 
and forestry.
Section Two summarizes the positive trends 
of the last two decades in the forest sector in the 
three countries. Section Three observes some of 
the “old habits,” that constrain the forest agendas 
for conservation, poverty alleviation or national 
economic development. Section Four draws some 
general points from the evidence presented in the 
chapter and Section Five concludes.
2. New forest agendas in 
Latin America
The Amazon region countries have completed 
important forestry reforms over the last decades, 
as part of the global trends in forestry mentioned 
above. There are three main indicators of the 
changes that have occurred. The clearest indicator is 
the widespread forest and forestland tenure reform. 
A second indicator is the change in forest related 
decision making and the extent to which decision 
making became more democratic and participative. 
A last indicator is the progress that has been made in 
so-called “communal forestry” in various countries 
in the region.
Tenure reform
Brazil’s most recent land and forest tenure 
reform began with the revised 1988 constitution 
which recognized rights to land by indigenous 
people and slave descendents. The same constitution 
also distinguishes between public and private 
property, determining that forests held under any 
other regimes but private property are considered 
public lands. The total area of 381 indigenous lands 
and 35 extractive reserves is about 115 million ha, 
or over 20% of the Brazilian Amazon (Chirif and 
Garcia-Hierro 2007, Stone 2006). In addition to 
these two categories, Brazil recognizes land rights 
held by communities of slaved descendents, and so 
called sustainable use settlement projects, which are 
similar to extractive reserves.
An important and widely known example 
of tenure reform related to forests is that of the 
extractive reserves of Brazil. Extractive reserves 
are large areas of mainly forested lands, mostly 
found in the Eastern Amazon, where the resident 
population has been granted exclusive use for forest 
exploitation. Extractive reserves result from claims 
by local populations that protecting their customary 
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forest use is a sustainable development and forest 
conservation strategy. By 2006, extractive reserves 
totaled of over 8 million ha, with individual sizes 
varying between 1,181 ha and 1,319,661 ha (Stone 
2006, Cronkleton et al. 2008).
The establishment of indigenous territories in 
Bolivia parallels the extractive reserves in Brazil. 
Bolivia began to revise its forest governance in 
the early 1990s. A significant step was signing the 
ILO Convention 169 in early 1992, which calls 
for the recognition of indigenous property rights 
over lands which were historically under customary 
ownership. Bolivia subsequently enacted legislation 
to implement the convention and initiated wide 
ranging land tenure reform. Since the mid 1990s, 
large stretches of ancestral lands have been granted to 
indigenous groups as original communal territories 
(TCO for its acronym in Spanish). Sources provide 
different figures about the number and extent of 
TCOs. Chirif and Garcia Hierro (2008) provide 
a figure of 12.5 million ha of land that has been 
requested by indigenous groups, of which 7.4 
million ha had been titled by 2006. 
In addition, other legislation allows formal 
recognition of erstwhile legally nonexistent rural 
communities and has allowed farmer communities 
in the forest rich Bolivian Amazon to be granted 
communal lands. The size of the grant is equivalent 
to the number of families in the community times 
500 ha. As a result several million ha of forestland in 
the north are now communally owned, in addition 
to the TCOS held by indigenous groups.
The picture of tenure reform in Peru is less 
unequivocal as in Bolivia or Brazil. Taylor (2006b) 
mentions that state recognition of indigenous 
land rights already happened in 1916. However, 
only in 1974 did the country’s legislation formally 
recognize indigenous communities as a legal 
entity that can solicit property rights over forest 
territory. A territory titling process for indigenous 
communities only began in the 1980s, but has 
meanwhile resulted in over 10 million ha of land 
being titled for indigenous communities. This is 
only 62% of about 16 million ha that AIDESEP, 
the association representing Peru’s indigenous 
federations, proposed as a goal (Chirif and Garcia-
Hierro 2007).
The legislation, however, distinguishes between 
rights to agricultural versus forest land. An 
indigenous community may hold legal property 
rights over the former, but only usufruct rights over 
the latter (Chirif and Garcia-Hierro 2007). Lakes 
and rivers, common in most parts of the Peruvian 
Amazon and an integral part of customary territories, 
are entirely excluded from the indigenous territories 
legislation. These stipulations seriously weaken the 
rights held by indigenous communities, and cases 
have occurred in which government officials chose 
to ignore even those recognized rights and allow 
intrusion by other parties, even leading to violent 
conflicts (Chirif 2008). Of further concern is the 
quest for sub-soil natural resources. Almost the 
entire Peruvian Amazon is carved up for possible 
exploitation; 36 million ha overlap with indigenous 
territories. While communities must technically be 
consulted if mineral exploration is to take place, it 
does not mean that communities are protected from 
danger: companies operating inside watersheds 
have left parts of indigenous territories with high 
levels of contamination and near toxic levels of 
contamination of the resident population.
In addition to indigenous communities, a 
significant number of farming communities occupy 
territory along rivers and the main roads. While most 
of them have some degree of formal recognition 
by the state, there are few who have acquired the 
legal status of comunidad campesina. Those that do 
not have this status are not able to hold legal title 
over territory. In practice the communities in the 
Amazon that are formally recognized also have a 
communal territory (see http://www.siamazonia.
org.pe accessed 2009-2-6). These are usually small 
areas, and formal property rights can be held only 
by individuals. In addition, communities have so 
called communal reserves, protected areas over 
which communities hold limited rights for natural 
resource use. 
Democratization of forest 
decision making 
The three countries reviewed here have 
experienced important decentralization processes 
over the last two decades (Larson et al. 2006). These 
decentralization reforms have been significant and 
far reaching. While they have impacted forest 
decision making in different degrees, without doubt 
decentralization—as well as other related governance 
reforms—has had important implications for the 
democratization of forest decision making.
Brazil has a federal political structure, which 
means that while national policy and legislation 
define the general aspects of forestry, state 
governments have gained important influence 
over forest matters: control of forest policies falls 
within state jurisdiction (Larson et al. 2006, 
Stone 2006). For instance, the state of Acre, the 
home of the rubber tapper movement, has since 
1998 promoted sustainable forest management, 
including community based initiatives (Stone 
2006). Brazil, like many other countries in South 
America and elsewhere, has also assigned important 
responsibilities, authority and resources to 
municipal governments. However, most municipal 
governments carry out little forest decision making. 
Specific agencies in charge of forest property 
categories dominate decision making where diverse 
property regimes is concerned. The extent to which 
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these agencies allow for democratic decision making 
varies per agency. 
While formal governance reforms—mostly 
reflected in the decentralization process—have yet 
to seriously affect forest decision making, several 
agencies and state governments have become more 
susceptible to pressures from forest stakeholders 
and their support organizations. The latter have 
formed various more or less formal coalitions, often 
reaching beyond national borders (Colchester et al. 
2003). By using national and international media 
and political lobbying, forest stakeholders have 
become effective in influencing agencies and state 
governments in the definition of forest related 
policies. The literature also reports that Brazilian 
state governments have become more forest 
and forestry development minded on their own 
initiative, even where civil society organizations 
remain weak (Stone 2006).
Beginning in the 1990s, Bolivia experienced 
a municipalization process similar to Brazil’s. 
Decentralization reforms and a new forest law gave 
municipal governments wide reaching decision 
making autonomy over municipal forest lands. 
These reforms meant that forests could be given out 
as concessions to organized groups other than forest 
companies. Forest-rich municipal governments 
were required to set up their own forest unit, and 
in some municipalities they actually took activities 
over from the national forest agencies (Taylor 
2006a). In addition to making forest decision 
making more democratic, the changes also made 
the forest sector more accountable and transparent 
and eliminated some of the most blatant political 
patronage that marked the sector before the mid-
1990s reform. 
The forestry reform fundamentally changed the 
rules of forest exploitation in Bolivia. Concession 
holders, including communities, now pay a fee 
per area and not per volume of product exploited 
as before. The new fee structure was expected to 
finance agencies in charge of implementing and 
monitoring and leave funds to be invested into 
forest research. Furthermore, the demands on 
forest management plans and annual operation 
plans became stricter. 
While decentralization in Peru has not 
progressed at the same pace as in Bolivia and Brazil, 
the country has experienced other encouraging 
forest governance reform mechanisms. Peru enacted 
decentralization legislation to transfer important 
faculties and resources to departmental governments 
and municipalities. The actual implementations of 
these new regulations, however, have been quite 
slow, largely because of a tenacious resistance from 
past several central governments in power. Only in 
the last few years have Amazonian departmental 
governments actually been taking over control of 
forest governance.
However, as in Brazil, civil society in Peru 
has been quite pro-active in pursuing local land 
rights, sustainable forestry and communal forestry 
agendas. During the early 2000s shortly after the 
collapse of the Fujimori regime when the country 
was in serious political crisis, in several regions in 
the country including Lima so-called forest mesas 
de concertación (reconciliation tables) emerged. 
Mesas de concertación were regular meetings of 
actors who had some interest or stake in the forest 
sector to discuss pressing agendas that had not 
been agreed upon by the participants. While mesas 
de concertación had no formal authority, they were 
quite influential and were taken very seriously by 
the various government agencies. The latter also 
actively participated in the meetings. The mesas 
de concertación forestal or related groups continue 
today in Peru and in some cases have become quite 
influential forums.
Advances in communal forestry
Sabogal et al. (2008) consider communal 
forestry as all forest management not carried out 
by corporate or single person enterprises, with the 
purpose of improving the well being of members 
of villages or other types of settlements through 
sustainable forest use. Community forestry 
operates within the bounds of relevant legislation, 
makes collective decisions on areas being managed, 
applies reduced impact management, focuses 
mainly on forest product commercialization and 
receives external technical support. While this 
definition of communal forestry excludes, for 
instance, forest management carried out by many 
Amazonian residents that is not market-oriented, 
it does, however, allow for an assessment of how 
much progress forestry reform is making in 
achieving development objectives. Regardless, data 
on communal forestry is hard to come by, which 
makes assessing progress difficult even under such a 
narrow definition. 
While communal forestry, often manifested 
as communal forestry enterprises (Molnar et al. 
2007), has made considerable progress in countries 
like Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras, the 
progress is more limited in Amazonian countries. 
In Brazilian state of Acre, where communal forestry 
has progressed most (Ibid.), government support 
for communal forest initiatives has significantly 
improved (Cronkleton et al. 2008). The support 
shifted its focus from rubber, to Brazil nut, and 
finally to also include timber. Rubber used to be the 
mainstay of communal forestry in Acre before it was 
replaced by Brazil nut when state rubber subsidies 
stopped. Brazil nut production was eventually 
outstripped by Bolivia, prompting the recent focus 
on timber that has taken place in Acre. While some 
communities have been making the transition to 
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timber, this has not yet been a region-wide trend 
because of locally limited capacities and persistent 
constraints from regulatory agencies. Since 2000, 
the state government has expanded its support to 
26 communities that previously largely focused on 
rubber. In 2005 a cooperative was established to 
support timber producing communities. Because of 
the constraints and limited progress, many people 
are turning to cattle ranching as an alternative to 
communal timber production (Cronkleton et al. 
2008).
One trajectory of communal forestry can be seen 
from the example of the sustainable development 
reserve in Mamirauá in the state of Amazonas. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, communities began 
to protect fish stocks in lakes located within the 
forest territory. In the mid-1980s, conservationists 
started to promote the region as a conservation area. 
Since then, communities, conservationists and the 
Amazonas government have negotiated to reach 
common ground. Existing communal organizations 
set up since the 1970s played an important role 
in the progress made. Important advances have 
also been made in organizing communal logging, 
building very much on existing communal practices. 
An important adaptation has been to simplify the 
regulatory norms for communal logging so that 
participants do not have to prepare the elaborate 
and expansive management plans usually required 
(Cronkleton et al. 2008).
Communal forestry in Bolivia has equally 
significant experiences to report. Communities 
have several ways to access the forest for communal 
forestry. They can organize themselves as a social site 
group (ASL for its acronym in Spanish) in which 
case they can access public lands outside communal 
territory. By 2006 the Forest Service had approved 
29 ASL management plans for a total of 600,000 
ha, and some 83 ASLs had registered. Not all ASL 
members, however, are community members, 
as several cases are known of ASLs composed of 
members who reside in local towns.
Bolivia’s forest law grants indigenous inhabitants 
exclusive rights to exploit forest products from the 
lands they own, including TCO lands. Nebel et al. 
(2003) estimate that indigenous groups hold 8.3 
million ha of forest with commercially valuable 
timber. In 2006, 83 indigenous community forest 
enterprises had a forest management plan or an 
annual logging plan and exploited more than 1.3 
million ha (Benneker 2008). NGOs finance most 
of the forest management plans and annual logging 
plans, and corporate forest enterprises finance an 
important number of annual logging plans. About 
20% of the plans were financed independently.
The influence of private companies in 
communal forest development in Bolivia is most 
notable in the increase of farmer communities 
managing forest areas over 200 ha, an area that 
needs a formally approved management plan. By 
2006, 52 communities held forest management 
plans and 28 held annual logging plans of a 
combined area of more than 500 thousand ha. 
About two thirds of these plans were financed by 
timber companies and about one third by NGOs. 
When timber companies finance the management 
plans, communities sell their timber exclusively to 
the company, and the company may be fully in 
charge of the logging. Several mechanisms exist for 
farmers to log smaller tracks of forest with more 
simple procedures. However, in many instances, 
these mechanisms have been used to illegally log 
timber from wider areas (Cronkleton and Albernoz 
2004, Benneker 2008).
The Brazil nut sector in northern Bolivia 
has experienced important communal forestry 
progress. Previously most Brazil nut stands were 
held in private estates by the regional economic 
elite. As a result of the region-wide devolution of 
forestlands to communities, community members 
have increasingly shifted to harvesting Brazil nuts 
from their own communal lands instead of working 
as laborers on private estates. In the department of 
Pando alone, 157 communities had their communal 
land formally recognized as part of the national land 
titling process. Approximately 40% of the territory 
in Pando, a total of 2.4 million ha, is now under 
indigenous or communal ownership. All of these 
communities are likely to be harvesting Brazil nuts 
from their own lands.
Peruvian legislation defines communal forests 
as located within indigenous lands and small farmer 
communities; these forests are for exclusive use by 
the communities, providing they are exploited with 
approved management plans. Legislation related to 
protected areas requires consultation with resident 
communities, and their representatives must join 
protected area management committees.
Peru’s progress in communal forest management 
was heavily influenced by its turbulent recent 
history. During much of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the important forest regions were controlled by 
insurgent groups or were the theater of battles with 
armed forces. The actual management of forests 
by communities, to the extent that community 
forestry as defined by Sabogal et al. (2008) is taking 
place, is still limited to some 80 initiatives. Some 
important experiences do exist related to protected 
areas and forest with similar status (Alvarez et 
al. 2007). However, in general protected area 
management remains top down and does not 
truly meet participatory standards (Swiderska et al. 
2008).
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3. Old habits in Latin 
American forest policies
The persistent timber industry
In Brazil, Bolivia and Peru the timber industry 
has continued to thrive and remains an important 
player in the forest policy arena; as such, timber 
companies often interfere with the forest activities 
of other actors.
Since signing the new forest law in 2006, 
Brazil introduced the concept of national forests 
and expects to designate 50 million ha as national 
forests by 2010. In 2005, a new concession system 
was enacted for the exploitation of national forests, 
and the newly establish Brazilian Forest Service is 
now in charge of its implementation. This policy, 
however, still awaits full implementation as only 14 
million m3 of timber were authorized to be logged 
in 2004, while that year saw production 24.5 
million m3 (Barreto et al. 2006), about two thirds 
for domestic consumption. Brazil also has 28% of 
its Amazon territory designated as conservation 
area and plans to protect an additional 10% (GFW 
2009).
The forest sector in Bolivia has changed 
dramatically in the past three decades. The country’s 
timber industry expanded significantly in the 1970s 
when tropical forests became accessible because 
of oil exploitation. Then nationwide economic 
decline, particularly the differential exchange rate 
applied at the time, negatively affected the timber 
sector. Once Bolivia adopted neoliberal economic 
policies, the timber sector bounced back. However, 
the sector became notoriously corrupt and a tool 
for political patronage. By 1994, timber companies 
had been granted 20 million ha of forests for 
logging; production had increased from 320,000 
to 448,000 m3. During the late 1990s, production 
declined drastically because of a regional economic 
crisis and also because of the new, stricter forest 
regulations. The 2005 production reached 826,000 
m3 and in Bolivia some 2 million ha of forest land 
were certified, mostly in large concessions (Pacheco 
et al. forthcoming).
The forest sector in Peru had mostly collapsed 
by the beginning of the 1990s because of civil war 
and threats from insurgent groups which controlled 
access routes to timber-rich forests. When the civil 
war subsided, the industry rebounded though 
initially with little effective regulation or control. 
Timber came mostly from annual harvesting 
rights over 1000 ha areas, but companies were 
exploiting much larger areas in reality. The new 
timber legislation assigns exploitation rights based 
on public bidding with an area-based fee and 
under strict management and administrative rules. 
However, the implementation of forest regulation 
is minimal, and almost all of Peru’s timber is from 
illegal sources.
The fact remains that, despite efforts to 
control the timber industry, illegal logging is 
rampant in Peru, Brazil and Bolivia. Barreto et al. 
(2006) suggest that 40% of Brazil’s production is 
illegal, and most experts estimate that 90% of the 
timber from the Peruvian tropical lowlands is logged 
illegally. Furthermore, given the administrative and 
technical requirements required to run logging 
operations (see the next section), new forest actors 
often have no other choice than to turn to companies 
to assist them when trying to get access to timber 
on land that is now theirs (Benneker 2009), mostly 
on very unfavorable terms for communities.
Regulatory obstacles to 
democratic forestry
One of the consequences of the forestry reforms 
described above is that stricter rules on forest 
exploitation apply to all users. Corporate actors, 
small entrepreneurs, and community actors are 
required to follow often unreasonable regulations 
that do not adequately consider the potential impact 
of certain forest uses or users or the capacities of the 
users to comply with the regulations. 
In Bolivia and Peru, there is no distinction 
between who engages in forest exploitation and 
the technical requirements of the exploitation. In 
Bolivia, a distinction is made for timber exploitation 
of areas larger and smaller than 200 ha. Areas under 
200 ha do not require a detailed management plan. 
However, for areas over 200 ha, forest companies, 
ASLs and communities all need to prepare 
technically complicated management plans that are 
costly to prepare and require expensive expertise, 
yet which are often ignored once approved. 
Brazil nut collection is another forest activity 
for which the Bolivian Ministry of Sustainable 
Development has elaborated a set of norms (MDS 
2009). However, the norms are shaped largely on 
a timber extraction model. In most cases, only 
people with professional training, certified as forest 
technicians, are allowed to prepare the necessary 
inventories and management plans in order to get 
official permission to extract Brazil nuts. This implies 
that, according to the rules, potential Brazil nut 
collectors, even those who collect from communal 
forest land, would need to engage university-
trained specialists to undertake the necessary data 
collection and prepare a management plan that 
conforms to the technical guidelines. However, 
the costs required for such management plans far 
surpass the income from Brazil nut collection. As 
a result, Brazil nut collection in Bolivia remains 
largely outside of any regulatory mechanism. 
As mentioned above, Brazil has actually 
adopted regulations that simplify the procedures 
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for communities engaging in timber extraction. 
However, Brazil is still the exception rather than 
the rule. In addition to the complex regulations 
and administrative procedures required to gain 
legal access to forests in Amazonian countries, 
institutional weakness, lack of administrative 
capacity and rampant corruption among agencies 
in charge of natural resource administration are 
common. One example from Peru that demonstrates 
these constraints involves an indigenous group, the 
Yacutaita. The group began an initiative in the late 
1990s to manage fish reserves—especially the highly 
priced and much sought after Arapaima gigas—in 
the Dorado Lake, located within the tropical 
lowland National Reserve Pacaya Samiria. With 
assistance from a Peruvian NGO, the Yacutaita 
prepared an A. gigas management plan, which 
focused mainly on monitoring the lake to keep out 
all illegal fishing. However, the plan took nine years 
to be approved, even though monitoring the species 
and establishing a corresponding fish quota is a 
fairly straightforward process. During these years, 
the community achieved an A. gigas population 
increase from a handful to 600 mature individuals. 
Only 10 percent of the mature population was to 
be harvested and sold annually, with which the 
community could finance the monitoring costs and 
still obtain a handsome profit. However, in 2008, 
even though the community had an approved 
management plan, the annual harvesting permit 
was rejected because of technical observations. This 
will likely undermine the monitoring activities, 
which are financed by the annual harvest. As a 
result, the Dorado Lake fish population will once 
again be subject to rampant illegal fishing (Chirif 
2009).
Political battlefields and forest 
policies
Bolivia, like many Latin American countries, 
has seen significant upheaval throughout most of 
its history. A new chapter began when Evo Morales 
and the MAS social movement were voted into 
power three years ago. MAS and Morales represent 
mostly Andean indigenous people and traditional 
coca growers, people who until recently had largely 
remained at the margins of the political theater, 
which, until recently, had been dominated by 
parties representing the economic elite and the 
more traditional labor organizations.
The political victories of MAS and Morales 
caused alienation with the elites in four of Bolivia’s 
nine departments in the eastern area of the country. 
Three of these departments, Santa Cruz, Beni and 
Pando also hold most of the country’s tropical 
lowland forest.
While the forest sector in Bolivia has experienced 
important and positive changes, as explained above, 
the sector also has serious structural weaknesses that 
require a sustained political and institutional support 
and possibly future adjustments (Ruiz 2005). The 
new forest regime relies on a national agency to 
administer and monitor, and municipalities and 
departmental governments are largely in charge 
of forest development of forests that are held as 
private property by indigenous groups and small 
farmer communities or as concessions by timber 
companies and ASLs. The system was working 
poorly, even before the MAS government took 
control of Bolivia. The national forest agency 
relied on fees and taxes from the sector for its 
daily operation, but forest users, especially timber 
companies, were unwilling or unable to pay the per 
area fees established under the new regulation. The 
forest sector was of little interest to departmental 
governments, and municipal governments often 
had insufficient capacity and resources to establish 
effective forest units. As a result, the new forest 
regime has almost collapsed. While it promoted 
forest devolution, allowed multiple actors to enter 
the sector and promoted democratic decision 
making, the new forest regime was largely a 
neoliberal endeavor, since it promoted profits and 
relied on market mechanisms. 
The MAS government intended to pursue a 
more socialist agenda, making community forestry 
a top priority (Pacheco et al. in preparation). This 
new focus, however, has hardly been pursued yet, 
in part because most of Bolivia forest activities 
are located within three departments that oppose 
the government. The departmental governments 
view the heads of the departmental offices of the 
national forest agencies as representatives of the 
MAS government. Furthermore, the same political 
battles are being played out at higher levels: USAID 
and various other international development 
agencies that supported forestry joined the trend of 
antagonizing the MAS government, even before the 
United States’ ambassador to Bolivia was expelled 
from the country in 2008. As a result of these 
recent developments, the Bolivian forest sector is 
in virtual stalemate. The successfully passed recent 
referendum, in which a new Constitution was 
adopted that promotes distribution and equity, 
including access to forest lands, is likely not to 
change the conflicting positions between the 
national government and forest-rich departments 
and municipalities. 
Similar conflicting national and regional 
tensions can be reported from Peru. In October 
2007, Peru’s president, Alan Garcia Perez, wrote 
in El Comercio, the country’s most respected 
newspaper, an article with the title: El syndrome del 
perro del hortelano, which loosely translates as “the 
dog in the manger.” It is a metaphor that symbolizes 
Garcia’s disagreement with forest policies which 
emphasize forest conservation, which recognize 
Page 32   |   CIAS Discussion Paper 8
ancestral rights, and which promote locally driven 
economic and social development.
The Garcia government’s views on the forest 
sector are driven by two main forces. One is its faith 
in neo-liberal economics as the way to solidify or 
expand the macro-economic growth that Peru has 
experienced since the end of 1990s economic crisis 
and political turmoil. When in power from 1985 
until 1990, Garcia and his APRA party pursued 
a progressive economic policy, which included a 
moratorium on national debt payments and the 
nationalization of major banks. Since returning 
to power in 2006, Garcia has pursued a neoliberal 
economic policy, continuing the trajectory of 
his predecessor, Alejandro Toledo. The second 
driving force is the recent free trade agreement 
with the United States. While that agreement 
was approved under the Bush administration, the 
majority Democratic Congress required that Peru 
address illegally logged timber entering in the 
United States. The Garcia Government has used 
the Peru-US FTA to pursue forest policies that are 
ultimately driven by a neoliberal economic agenda, 
favoring privatization and capital investment, 
with the expectation that this will benefit all forest 
stakeholders. The Garcia government proposed 
legislation—Decree 1015 and 1073— which 
would allow a simple majority of votes, as opposed 
to requiring a 66% majority as was established by 
previous legislation, to decide on the assignment of 
communal lands, including sales to outsiders. This 
was seen by many people as a measure to permit 
private companies to buy communal lands and 
use them as private investments. After widespread 
national and international protests, the proposal 
was voted down in August 2008. 
A similar example is the proposition of Decree 
1090, essentially a revision of the forest law 
demanded by the United States for the free trade 
agreement to be signed. The revision ironically 
identified as “the law of the jungle” created the 
opportunity to obtain private ownership over so-
called “vacant lands” (tierras eriazas). The lands 
described under this legislation can only be used for 
reforestation purposes. Supposedly, some 8 million 
ha of the 63 million ha of forest lands, are apt for 
such reforestation on privately held forestlands. 
Already some cases have been reported in which 
fully-grown forest was given as a reforestation 
concession, effectively giving a carte blanche for 
indiscriminate logging of the forests, something that 
is widely expected to occur under the proposed new 
legislation. Many also foresee legal opportunities 
for economically powerful actors to obtain legal 
ownership rights over land held under usufruct 
property rights by others.
4. Amazonian forest 
policy: A Sisyphus 
syndrome or a tripudium 
step?
On reviewing the evidence presented in 
sections two and three, there seems to be reason to 
be optimistic about Amazonian forestry and related 
forest policies; but at the same time there is reason 
for concern. Probably the biggest advance in the 
last two decades is that forestry is now generally 
viewed as a sector that can address some social goals 
by providing various services and addressing certain 
needs, including development and conservation, in 
addition to national economic growth. Not least of 
all, it is now widely recognized and even enacted 
as law that development objectives are primarily a 
matter to be determined by those who are to be 
affected.
The tenure reforms summarized above and 
described in more detail elsewhere (Larson et 
al. 2008) are certainly important and relevant 
advances, because they provide the very foundation 
necessary to realize the multiple goals that forests are 
now expected to fulfill. However, gaining property 
rights without any significant opportunities to 
improve additional outcomes make these changes 
meaningless. So far, the evidence  suggests that 
property rights reforms have not yet generated 
major additional positive outcomes. While 
communal forestry is being promoted and is 
having some success, the commercial timber sector 
has continued to expand, in many cases competing 
with communal forestry (Sabogal et al. 2008). 
Sunderlin et al. (2008) had to search extensively 
in the material that they have gathered on forest 
property changes between 2002 and 2008 to come 
up with a short list of examples where changes in 
property rights resulted in benefits to communities, 
lower levels of illegal logging or more sustainable 
use of forests. As Benneker (2008), de Jong et al. 
(2006) and Cronkleton et al. (2008) have shown, 
the private sector has adjusted to the property rights 
changes, but is in many cases coercing the new 
forest owners into agreements and collaborations in 
which the terms are largely dictated by the powerful 
and political well-connected private sector.
The governments and government agencies 
responsible for regulating and administering 
natural resources of Peru, Bolivia and Brazil are 
to be commended for advances, but at the same 
time they can be blamed for lack of progress. 
While at times enlightened government personnel 
might go to great efforts to adjust forest agendas 
to better comply with the multiple goals of the 
forest sector, it is this same sector that imposes 
obstacles to progress. For example, even though 
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there were serious weaknesses, there was much 
potential in the forest sector reforms in Bolivia 
in the 1990s; nonetheless, political infighting has 
seriously curtailed the positive trends. This has 
come on top of disingenuous attitudes among 
lower tiers of governments where often political 
success and survival had priority over implementing 
forest policies that would assure more equitable, 
democratic and sustainable outcomes.
The forest sector worldwide has been plagued 
in recent years by rampant illegality. This illegality 
is of great concern. It reflects on the one hand 
that societies are more concerned about their 
natural resources, that the value of tropical forest 
has increased, and that the sector is now better 
incorporated in national administration and 
regulation processes. As a result illegality has 
become more visible. On the other hand, the 
illegality shows that the possibilities to impose the 
rule of law on the forest sector have yet been quite 
limited. International Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade initiatives have arisen in 
response (e.g. Van Bodegom et al. 2008).
A major question remains on how these 
processes will influence the outcomes of future 
trends in forestry, now that the value of forest 
is being upgraded because of recognition of its 
importance in mitigating climate change. Many have 
suggested that REDD processes create important 
opportunities to generate incomes and that a 
great part of these incomes can be captured by the 
people who most need them and who traditionally 
have been excluded from capturing forest benefits 
by other players in the sector (Angelsen 2008). 
However, the Amazon has a history of economic 
booms and busts, when certain forest products 
from the region—quinine, rubber, barbasco, oil 
and timber—experienced increased international 
demand followed by sudden drops in prices. 
Compliance with rules and regulations and fair play 
has never been a common feature of the Amazon 
forest sector, and such compliance was certainly 
not a characteristic of the boom periods. While 
this is no ground to be pessimistic, it should pose 
a warning of the challenges ahead, if compensation 
for reduced deforestation or degradation will be 
widely implemented in Amazonia. Fortunately, 
since the issue at stake—global warming and its 
expected negative climatic consequences—is of 
international concern, there is likely to be serious 
international monitoring and pressure to ensure 
compliance with globally accepted standards of 
good governance. For instance, international 
pressure can in part be credited for the changes in 
property rights mentioned above.
The possible impact of the current financial 
crisis and future economic instability for groups 
that are at the edge of poverty, and what this 
means for the forest sector, should be of concern. 
In a future scenario of possible destitution caused 
by international economic instability, cases where 
people turn to forest and forest lands for solutions 
is not merely imaginary. Neither are possible related 
conflicts with the new forest owners, companies, 
or conservationists. The Peruvian case of Flor de 
la Frontera, where an indigenous group violently 
evicted illegal settlers within their territory in 2002 
and caused the death of 16 people, should be viewed 
as a warning of things to come. The administrative 
apparatus was inadequately prepared to deal 
with such problems; this is even more reason for 
concern.
5. Conclusions
Forest policy in countries of the Amazon 
basin has experienced many changes in the last 
two decades. Property rights reforms, improved 
democratic decision making and progress in 
communal forestry are all positive developments. 
On the other hand, national governments are 
reluctant to give up old ways because they want to 
maintain a viable timber sector for its contribution 
to the national economy and the need to satisfy 
national demand for timber. The tropical forest 
sector suffers from poor governance more than 
other sectors because of its recent history as a sector 
dominated by a small group of wealthy entrepreneurs 
and political cronies and because of the practical 
difficulties of monitoring the forest for compliance 
with the law. The unfamiliarity of many of the 
new actors, including remote local communities, 
with administrative procedures and/or their 
lack of political clout has limited their potential 
to seriously influence forest policy formulation 
and implementation. Furthermore, if economic 
instability affects large populations in Amazonian 
countries, people may increasingly turn to forests 
to make up for losses suffered elsewhere. Some 
recent cases suggest that this could increase conflicts 
between the new owners of tropical forests and 
people who are affected by economic decline. This 
is the landscape within which REDD mechanisms 
will be implemented, and these conditions need to 
be considered seriously if REDD mechanisms are 
to contribute to furthering the goals of equitable 
development and democratization. 
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